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5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
6 IN AND FOR KING COUNTY

7 ALEXANDER HOOKS,

8 Petitioner,

9 vs.

10 CITY OF SEATTLE and BRIAN KENNEDY as
11 Jail Population Coordinator,
12 Respondents.

No. 05-2-15477-2 SEA

COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

13 THIS MATTER is before this Court on petitioner Alexander Hooks'
14 petition for a writ of prohibition preventing his transfer by the City of Seattle to the
15 Yakima Jail while he awaits trial in Seattle Municipal Court.

16 This Court previously issued an Order on Application for Alternative Writ
17 Of Prohibition And Order To Show Cause. On May 25, 2005, the Court heard the
18 testimony of Michael Filipovic, Jeffery Robinson, Kenya Griffin, Alexandra
19 Ostrova, David Chapman, Kimberly Gordon, Alexander Hooks, Galia Benson-
20 Amram, Brian Kennedy, and Cynthia West and received evidence in support and in
21 opposition to petitioner's petition for writ of prohibition.

22 **I. FINDINGS OF FACT**

23 1. Petitioner is detained in lieu of \$10,000 bail while he awaits trial on
misdemeanor charges in Seattle Municipal Court.

- 1 2. While awaiting trial, he has twice been transferred by the City of Seattle to the
2 Yakima County Jail.
- 3 3. Mr. Hooks was transferred to Yakima pursuant to a contract between the City of
4 Seattle and Yakima County. The contract is authorized by Seattle Ordinance No.
5 121431. That ordinance permits the City of Seattle to house convicted
6 misdemeanants sentenced by Seattle Municipal Court in the Yakima Jail, and
7 defendants awaiting trial as well, if certain conditions are met. One of the
8 conditions is that Seattle Municipal Court population in the King County Jail
9 exceeds 90% of the beds Seattle is guaranteed in that facility under the city's
10 contract with King County. This matter before the Court does not involve nor
11 address any convicted City of Seattle misdemeanor defendant transferred to the
12 Yakima County Jail.
- 13
- 14 4. Respondent Brian Kennedy is the City of Seattle Jail Population Coordinator.
15 When the Seattle Municipal Court population in the King County Jail reaches
16 190 individuals, Mr. Kennedy identifies pre-trial defendants for transfer to
17 Yakima. King County jail has established a hierarchy of case type and posture in
18 selecting detainees to go to Yakima. However, defendants in all priorities,
19 including those in the lowest priority group, have been sent to Yakima since
20 February 2005. Mr. Hooks was a member of that lowest priority group— those
21 charged with domestic violence offenses who have not yet had a pre-trial hearing
22 at the time of his initial transfer to Yakima.
- 23

- 1 5. Petitioner Alexander Hooks is charged with a domestic violence offense and was
2 sent to Yakima the first time prior on April 13, 2005, prior to his pre-trial hearing
3 on April 25, 2005. He was transferred on the same day that counsel, H.L. Rogers
4 of Associated Counsel for the Accused, entered a notice of appearance for him.
5
6 6. For security reasons, neither jail personnel nor anyone else involved in
7 transferring pre-trial detainees to Yakima, including Mr. Kennedy, can alert the
8 defendants or their attorneys prior to their transfer. Counsel are advised after the
9 transfer.
10
11 7. Mr. Kennedy will arrange for a defendant to return from Yakima to the King
12 County Jail at the request of the defendant's attorney. Such arrangements
13 typically take two days from Mr. Kennedy's receipt of the request.
14
15 8. If bail is posted for a defendant who held in Yakima on a pending Seattle
16 Municipal Court case, depending on when it is posted, it can take up to 27 hours
17 for the defendant to be returned to Seattle and released. If bail is been posted to
18 secure a defendant's release, the defendant makes the trip back over the
19 mountains in restraints. The trip takes at least three hours. If bail was posted on
20 Sunday, it could take up to 51 hours for the defendant to be returned to Seattle
21 and released, as there is presently no transport from Yakima to Seattle on
22 Mondays.
23

1 9. Petitioner Hooks did not post bail. Nor was there any evidence that Mr. Hooks
2 intended to or was able to post bail.

3
4 10. When being transported back and forth between the King County Jail and
5 Yakima, Mr. Hooks was handcuffed each time, as were other similarly situated
6 defendants. Mr. Hooks described the pain as an 8 on a scale of 10 of level of
7 pain. The trip took more than 3 hours each way each time. On at least one
8 occasion the van made a stop between Seattle and Yakima at the Kirkland Jail to
9 take on another inmate. Mr. Hooks was not permitted to go to the bathroom
10 during one of the trips, which caused him extreme discomfort.

11
12 11. Both times that Mr. Hooks went to Yakima, he was returned because he had
13 pending court hearings, once in Seattle Municipal Court (a pre-trial hearing) and
14 once for the initial argument on the alternative writ in this court. On the second
15 occasion, he was also returned at the request of his attorney so that she could
16 convey a new plea offer made by the City Attorney.

17 12. Each time that Mr. Hooks was taken to Yakima, and each time he was returned
18 to the King County Jail, he was strip searched.

19
20 13. When Mr. Hooks was moved back and forth between jails, each time he was
21 subject to re- classification. He experienced uncertainty and worry because of
22 the possible loss of privileges and because the moves would unsettle the
23 accommodations he had made with other inmates and jail staff. He expressed

1 concern for his personal safety and discomfort based on his housing in Yakima;
2 and cultural differences of inmates there.

3 14. Mr. Hooks has been classified as a trustee (minimum security) in the King
4 County Jail, but is housed as medium/maximum security in Yakima. Unless a
5 sympathetic King County Jail staffer had intervened, Mr. Hooks would have
6 had to start the process of becoming a trustee all over upon his return to the
7 King County Jail on May 11, 2005.

8
9 15. When Mr. Hooks was transferred back from the King County Jail to Yakima,
10 the commissary items he had managed to assemble, including personal hygiene
11 supplies, were taken away and not returned. Out of the property he brought
12 from King County, only his legal papers were given to him in Yakima. For
13 some time he had to do without such items while he tried to accumulate the
14 funds to purchase them again.

15 16. When Mr. Hooks was taken to Yakima the second time, on May 8, 2005, the
16 video visitation system was not operating. His attorney went to use it upon
17 learning that he had been transferred to Yakima, and was told it would not be
18 operational for two weeks, although it did become operational earlier. In any
19 event, detainees in Yakima can not initiate contact with their lawyers through
20 video visitation even if it had been working. He attempted to call his lawyer by
21 phone, but was unable to reach her because there was no information about a
22 toll-free number for the Defender Association, only for Associated Counsel for
23

1 the Accused (ACA). Yakima Jail officials told him the only way he could
2 contact his lawyer would be to write a letter.

3 17. Mr. Hooks' attorney, Galia Benson-Amram, first learned that Mr. Hooks had
4 been transferred to Yakima two days after his transfer when she went to the
5 King County Jail on May 10 to discuss a new plea offer with him and was told
6 he had been transferred. Information on a client's transfer is available through
7 the King County Jail Register or through Brian Kennedy, only after the actual
8 transfer. Ms. Benson-Amram then attempted to call him. The first time she
9 called she was told no one was available to escort him to the phone and asked to
10 call back in 1 ½ to 2 hours. Because of other obligations she was next able to
11 call back approximately 3 hours later. At that time she was transferred to a
12 number which was answered by voicemail for a number of Yakima Jail
13 employees. There was no instruction on the message about who to contact to
14 have a phone conversation with a defendant.

15 18. Ms. Benson-Amram received the new offer from the City Attorney
16 unexpectedly, when she was dealing with another trial on the master trial
17 calendar and saw the prosecutor in Mr. Hooks' case.

18 19. Ms. Benson-Amram and Mr. Hooks were never able to talk to each other while
19 he was in Yakima despite the fact that both of them tried to reach the other.

20 20. Mr. Hooks did not learn of the new offer, which involved a recommendation of
21 credit for time served, until after he was brought back to the King County Jail at
22 Ms. Benson-Amram's request on May 11. Had he wished to accept that offer,
23 the fact that he was in Yakima when it was made likely would have caused a

1 delay up to a week to get into court for the change of plea. That is because add-
2 on motions are typically scheduled on Fridays and require several days' advance
3 notice. Regardless, Mr. Hooks did not accept the plea offer and there was no
4 evidence that the delay in communicating the plea affected his decision.

5 21. Mr. Hooks' resolve to go to trial was undermined by the continuing
6 apprehension that he would be returned to Yakima. He told counsel that he
7 would plead rather than serve out the pre-trial period in Yakima, and asked her
8 to do something to ensure he would not return to Yakima. Counsel asked the
9 trial judge to order that Mr. Hooks not be sent back to Yakima, but the judge
10 declined to order that Mr. Hooks remain in King County beyond May 2, shortly
11 after the bail reduction hearing scheduled for April 29, 2005. Despite her
12 efforts to prepare the writ of prohibition, Mr. Hooks was again sent to Yakima
13 on May 8, 2005, the day before the writ application was filed.

14 22. Mr. Hooks did not learn the status of the writ application until after he was
15 returned from Yakima on May 11, 2005. He believed he was being returned
16 because the writ had been granted. In fact, argument was scheduled for May 16,
17 2005, and no writ had yet been issued.

18 23. Ms. Benson-Amram has visited Mr. Hooks on approximately 10 occasions in
19 person in the King County Jail during the course of her representation of him.

20 24. It is a standard of practice for criminal defense lawyers to meet in person with
21 their clients to discuss any significant issues, including discovery, case strategy,
22 possible pleas, testimony, and release motions.
23

1 25. It is challenging for public defenders to establish trust with clients, including
2 Mr. Hooks, because the client has not chosen his own lawyer. Mr. Hooks needs
3 to meet in person with his lawyer to assess counsel. Mr. Hooks had the
4 opportunity to meet with counsel prior to the pre-trial hearing and on at least 10
5 other occasions face-to-face at the King County Jail.

6 26. In-person meetings between lawyer and client are essential for any significant
7 communication because of the importance of non-verbal communication, and
8 other visual observations about the client's physical, mental and emotional
9 condition.

10 27. The videoconferencing system has never worked very well and has been the
11 subject of longstanding unresolved complaints from lawyers concerning audio
12 delay and breakup, poor visual resolution imagery of the detainees, and
13 problems with the connection.

14 28. Telephone and video consultation, while possibly helpful as a supplement to in-
15 person meetings, if they are functioning properly, do not take the place of
16 necessary in-person meetings with in-custody defendants. Standing alone, they
17 are inadequate for the development and maintenance of a relationship of trust
18 and confidence between a defendant and his government-funded lawyer. They
19 are limited in their ability to permit non-verbal communication which can
20 convey information which is critical to the representation of the defendant. In
21 particular, they do not allow the defendant to go over discovery and other
22 documents or photos with his lawyer.

1 29. Phone and video communication between lawyers in Seattle and clients in
2 Yakima are not clearly confidential. Even when lawyers had been assured by
3 the City of Seattle that telephone calls would be confidential, Yakima Jail
4 officers and other people have frequently been able to hear the defendant's side
5 of the conversation and sometimes counsel's statements, also. Other people are
6 sometimes visible on the inmate's side of a video visitation, and are audible,
7 suggesting that they must be able to hear the inmate's conversation. However,
8 counsel and Mr. Hooks did not have any video conferencing meetings, nor was
9 any confidentiality compromised.

10 30. As recently as May 23, 2005, it was impossible for Ms. Benson-Amram to
11 establish a video link to her client Terrell Cotton, who was held in Yakima on
12 that date (although he has not yet had his pre-trial hearing), although she
13 followed all posted directions and sought help from the probation services
14 department and from Brian Kennedy, as instructed on two different information
15 sheets.

16 31. The process lawyers must go through in order to attempt phone or video
17 communication with their clients in Yakima is cumbersome, time-consuming
18 and unpredictable. An attempt to communicate may require several efforts and
19 may then fail altogether because of technological or staffing problems. In
20 contrast, a visit in person to the King County Jail is fast and predictable. Visits
21 begin within 6-15 minutes of the lawyer's arrival at the jail. Visits can happen
22 any time of the day or night. In contrast, video visitation is available only
23 through the probation services department during the work week, and only

1 during probation business hours. Family visitation is limited to certain hours on
2 the weekends.

3 32. Public defenders working in Seattle Municipal Court have a caseload of
4 approximately 380 cases per year. They can receive an average of 32 cases per
5 month and often have 80-100 active cases at any given time. Managing this
6 caseload requires a great deal of flexibility and last-minute adjustments to
7 scheduling. Visits to in-custody clients, while critical, must usually be worked
8 in and around court and office obligations. Often the best time to visit clients in
9 the jail will occur when a trial unexpectedly resolves, for example. Conversely,
10 what had appeared to be an opportunity to visit the jail may evaporate because
11 of unexpected emergencies, deadlines or court obligations.

12 33. The City will bring defendants back to King County Jail at the request of their
13 lawyer, approximately two days after the request.

14 34. A defendant faces a Hobson's Choice, of sorts, between meeting in person with
15 his lawyer, and avoiding a discomfoting trip across the mountains with the
16 insecurities attendant to being strip-searched, re-classified in King County Jail,
17 and losing much or all of accumulated commissary items. It appears under
18 individual circumstances that the attorney-client relationship may deteriorate
19 because of the attendant costs to the defendant, or in-person visits will not occur
20 as often as they need to and as often as they would, if the defendant remained in
21 the King County Jail.

22 35. Despite efforts by the City, it is clear that the systems in place to contact clients
23 in Yakima, both phone and videoconferencing, may be inadequate to allow for

1 the necessary level of attorney client communication necessary for effective
2 representation. In this instance, Mr. Hooks' counsel met with him at least ten
3 times in the King County Jail and there was no evidence that the level of
4 communication necessary for effective representation had been impaired by Mr.
5 Hooks' detention in Yakima.

6 36. Being in Yakima will delay a defendant's access to the court for purposes of
7 any "add-on" motion, including previously unscheduled motions hearings, bail
8 reduction hearings, or hearings on a change of plea. In Mr. Hooks' case, had he
9 wished to accept the City's "time served" offer made on May 10, by the time he
10 returned from Yakima, he may have had to wait as long as Friday, May 20, for
11 an add-on change of plea hearing. Being held in Yakima could have resulted in
12 a 7-10 day delay in his release, assuming the court followed the City's
13 sentencing recommendation. As noted, Mr. Hooks did not accept this offer and
14 no hypothetical delay occurred.

15 37. Counsel must review discovery in person with their clients. Counsel are
16 precluded from providing copies of the discovery to their clients by CrRLJ 4.7.
17 Supplementary discovery is often provided by the prosecutor as the case
18 proceeds. Defense investigation also develops as the case proceeds, and often
19 must be discussed with the defendant, which requires in-person meetings.
20 There was no indication that counsel's ability to share discovery with Mr.
21 Hooks was impaired in this case.

22 38. Under the existing caseload limits pertaining to public defenders in Seattle
23 Municipal Court, each lawyer has somewhat less than 5 hours per case to meet

1 with their client, review discovery, request additional discovery, attend court
2 hearings, conduct legal research, investigate the case, negotiate with the
3 prosecutor, prepare for trial (if any) and conduct a trial (if any), develop
4 alternative sentencing recommendations and advise the client about appellate
5 rights, if relevant.

6 39. Due to the press of other work, public defenders practicing in Seattle Municipal
7 Court are unable to drive to Yakima to visit their clients in person in Yakima.
8 It is unrealistic to expect public defenders to expend the time to travel round-trip
9 to Yakima to meet with clients housed there, given the extent of their caseload
10 and unpredictability in scheduling.

11 40. The director of the largest defender agency practicing in Municipal Court
12 believes that, while pre-trial defendants are held in Yakima, Seattle is not
13 ensuring

14 ... confidential access to the client for the full
15 exchange of legal, procedural, and factual
16 information between counsel and client. To ensure
17 confidential communications, private meeting
space should be available in jails, prisons,
courthouses, and other places where defendants
must confer with counsel.

18 See, ABA, "10 Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System." , Commentary
19 to Principle No. 4.

20 41. The transfer of pre-trial defendants to Yakima creates obstacles to
21 communication with family and other supporters. Family who used to visit in
22 person often can no longer do so, and certainly not with the frequency they
23 could at the King County Jail. The cost, in time and gas, is prohibitive for

1 many. Video visitation is available on the weekends only, and phone calls are
2 collect and expensive.

3 42. Family members and friends may assist in the defense of someone awaiting trial
4 in a number of ways. They may organize bail, and provide other logistical
5 assistance to the pre-trial detainee (e.g., caring for children, pets, home; paying
6 rent and bills; communicating with employer) allowing him to wait for his trial
7 date rather than accept a plea offer with a "time served" recommendation so
8 that he can get out to attend to these logistical concerns in person. The public
9 defenders' experience is that clients held on misdemeanors are frequently
10 offered credit for time served offers. Whether a particular defendant can remain
11 in jail waiting for a trial date often depends on the consequences of remaining
12 incarcerated on their employment and housing status, and any public benefits.
13 Family, community and friends are therefore important in assisting defendants
14 in maintaining their jobs and housing while in custody so that they may make it
15 to their trial date. Due to the limited amount of time that Mr. Hooks actually
16 spent in the Yakima County Jail, there was no indication that he was actually
17 denied any of these opportunities or deprived of access to bail, logistical
18 assistance, or other considerations.

19 43. Mr. Hooks has a trial date of June 1, 2005. Pursuant to jail policy, Mr. Hooks
20 would have been returned to King County Jail awaiting trial two to three court
21 days prior to trial, i.e., no later than May 27, 2005. Although trials are often
22 delayed or continued, there was no indication that Mr. Hooks' trial would be
23 delayed or continued. Moreover, there was no indication that Mr. Hooks would

1 be transferred back to Yakima during such delay or continuance. Finally, the
2 necessity for face-to-face meetings between counsel and client is less apparent
3 once the case is actually ready to proceed to trial, and is delayed for
4 administrative or other reasons.

- 5 44. To the extent that any Finding is more properly characterized as a Conclusion,
6 or vice versa, the same should be treated as such.

7 Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:

8 9 **II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

- 10 1. Petitioner seeks the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the
11 King County Jail, under authority from the City of Seattle, from transferring
12 him to the Yakima County Jail, prior to his trial. The superior court has
13 authority to issue writs of prohibition to arrest "the proceedings of any tribunal,
14 corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of
15 the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person." [RCW 7.16.290](#).
16 The statutory writ may be invoked to prohibit judicial, legislative, executive, or
17 administrative acts if the official or body to whom it is directed is acting in
18 excess of its power. [Winsor v. Bridges](#), 24 Wash. 540, 543, 64 P. 780 (1901).
19
20 2. Prohibition is a drastic remedy and may only be issued where (1) a state actor is
21 about to act in excess of its jurisdiction and (2) the petitioner does not have a
22 plain, speedy and adequate legal remedy. [County of Spokane v. Local 1553](#),
23 [American Federation of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO](#), 76
[Wash.App. 765, 768, 888 P.2d 735 \(1995\)](#); *see also* [Kreidler v. Eikenberry](#), 111

1 Wash.2d 828, 838, 766 P.2d 438 (1989). If either of these factors is absent, the
2 court cannot issue a writ of prohibition. *Kreidler*, 111 Wash.2d at 838, 766 P.2d
3 438.

4 3. R.C.W. 70.48.090 expressly provides for interlocal contracts for jail services for
5 contracts for jail services which may be made between a county and a city, and
6 among counties and cities.

7
8 4. Mr. Hooks has standing to seek a writ of prohibition. He has already been
9 transferred to Yakima twice in six weeks, and nothing in the City policy on
10 transfer of pre-trial detainees proscribes a future transfer to Yakima. Petitioner
11 seeks to preclude his future transfer if his trial is continued for some reason.

12 5. Petitioner challenges the enabling legislation, Seattle City Ordinance No.
13 121431, authorizing transfer of pre-trial detainees - as unconstitutional as applied
14 to Mr. Hooks. Petitioner claims that the ordinance – as applied to him – has a
15 substantial likelihood of violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
16 Amendment in that it would deny, compromise and/or unduly burden Mr.
17 Hooks’ procedural rights as a criminal defendant awaiting trial, including his
18 Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his due process right of access to the courts,
19 his right to a jury trial, and his right to bail under Art. 1 Sec. 20 of the
20 Washington Constitution.

21
22 6. “A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its
23 constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a

1 reasonable doubt." *State v. Thorne*, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514
2 (1996). To fulfill that burden, one must show that "no set of circumstances exists
3 in which the statute, as currently written, can be constitutionally applied."
4 *Moore*, 151 Wash.2d at 669, 91 P.3d 875. Where a statute is found facially
5 unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy is declaring that statute inoperative or
6 void. *Id.* In contrast, alleging a statute is unconstitutional as-applied, as
7 petitioner contends here requires showing only that application of the statute to
8 the party's specific actions is unconstitutional. *Id.* at 668-69, 91 P.3d 875.
9 "Holding a statute unconstitutional as-applied prohibits future application of the
10 statute in a similar context, but the statute is not totally invalidated." *Id.* at 669,
11 91 P.3d 875. See *State v. Hughes*, 110 P.3d 192 (Wash., April 14, 2005) In *City*
12 *Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80
13 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the United States Supreme Court found a Los Angeles
14 ordinance unconstitutional as applied, "limit[ing its] analysis of the
15 constitutionality of the ordinance to the concrete case before [the Court]." *Id.* at
16 803, 104 S.Ct. 2118. The Court held utility poles in Los Angeles were not public
17 fora under the First Amendment because the challengers "fail[ed] to demonstrate
18 the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles
19 for purposes of their communication comparable to that recognized for public
20 streets and parks." *Id.* at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Thus, in the instant case, this court
21 limits its analysis of the constitutionality of the subject Seattle ordinance
22 authorizing transfer of pre-trial detainees to the concrete case before this court.
23

1 7. In general, challenges by pre-trial detainees to the circumstances of their
2 confinement are analyzed under the rubric of due process. *See Bell v. Wolfish*,
3 441 U.S. 520, 537 n. 16 (1979). If detainees' conditions of confinement amount
4 to punishment, "or otherwise violate the Constitution," due process is violated.
5 *Id.* at 536-37. Although *Bell v. Wolfish* is most often cited for the rule that pre-
6 trial detainees may not be "punished," it is clear that other violations of
7 detainees' procedural due process rights may invalidate aspects of their pre-trial
8 confinement. *See, e.g., Benjamin v. Fraser*, 264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001)
9 (limitations on access to counsel denied due process; no argument that the
10 limitations constituted or were intended as punishment); *cf. Procunier v.*
11 *Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (regulations which obstruct access to legal
12 representation or other aspects of access to court, even for convicted prisoners,
13 violate due process).

14 8. Courts have approved the removal of *convicted* prisoners to locations far
15 distant from their communities and families. *See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461
16 U.S. 238 (1983) (upholding transfer of prisoner from Hawai'i to mainland to
17 serve sentence where there were inadequate detention facilities in Hawai'i);
18 *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); *White v. Lambert*, 370 F.3d
19 1002 (9th Cir.), *cert denied sub nom White v. Morgan*, 160 L.Ed.2d 379 (2004)
20 (transfer of convicted prisoner from Washington to private prison in Colorado
21 did not violate due process); *In re Matteson*, 142 Wn.2d 298 (2000). This
22 abrogation of prisoners' community ties is invariably justified by reference to the
23 fact of conviction, and to the concept that convicted offenders forfeit many rights

1 enjoyed by the innocent. *See, e.g., Olim, supra* at 248 n.9 (“respondent in no
2 sense has been banished; *his conviction*, not the transfer, deprived him of his
3 right to freely inhabit the State”) (emphasis added); *Meachum, supra* (because
4 conviction extinguishes liberty interests, convicted prisoners could be transferred
5 to any prison within the state prison system).

6
7 9. The same justification does not apply to those who are still presumed innocent of
8 the charges they face, and who are in custody solely because they cannot afford to
9 post the bail set by the court. “Pretrial detainees have federally protected liberty
10 interests that are different in kind from those of sentenced inmates.” *Cobb v.*
11 *Aytch*, 643 F.2d 946, 957 (3d Cir. 1981) (enjoining prison transfers that
12 “significantly interfered” with pretrial detainees’ access to counsel).

13 10. The issue before this Court is solely whether the reasonable probability of a
14 future transfer of Mr. Hooks to Yakima prior to his trial would deny petitioner
15 access to the court which has jurisdiction over the charges he faces and which set
16 the terms of his pre-trial detention.

17 11. Even convicted prisoners’ right of access to courts and counsel must be
18 preserved:

19
20 The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as
21 a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded
22 access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful
23 convictions and to seek redress for violations of their
constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a
reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance
of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably
obstruct the availability of professional representation or

1 other aspects of the right of access to the courts are
2 invalid.

3 *Procunier v. Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), citing *Ex Parte Hull*, 312 U.S.
4 546 (1941). This interest is only heightened for pre-trial detainees who face the
5 imminent prospect of trial, and who have a right to present changed
6 circumstances to the court as a basis for release or modification of bail. CrRLJ
7 3.2(j) (1).

8 12. Although this Court is disturbed that access to counsel, and/or to the courts for
9 pre-trial hearings, may be impaired as a consequence of a pre-trial detainee's
10 transfer to and housing in Yakima County Jail, petitioner has failed to show the
11 substantial likelihood of such impairment or deprivation to him at this stage of
12 the municipal court litigation. As noted, Mr. Hooks has a trial date of June 1,
13 2005. Pursuant to jail policy, Mr. Hooks would have been returned to King
14 County Jail awaiting trial two to three court days prior to trial, i.e., no later than
15 May 27, 2005. Although trials are often delayed or continued, there is no
16 indication that Mr. Hooks' trial would be delayed or continued. Thus, as to Mr.
17 Hooks, petitioner has not demonstrated the substantial likelihood of: (1) a delay
18 or continuance in Mr. Hooks' municipal court trial; (2) a transfer of Mr. Hooks
19 back to Yakima; and (3) the impairment of due process access after counsel and
20 petitioner have prepared for and are ready for a June 1, 2005 trial date.

21
22 13. Petitioner asserts that the City action he seeks to prevent – transfer to Yakima in
23 the future – while not certain to occur, is not so speculative as to deny Mr. Hooks

1 standing to seek a writ of prohibition, contrasting *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*,
2 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (victim of illegal chokehold lacked standing to seek
3 prospective injunctive relief because there was no suggestion that he was any
4 more likely than any other member of the population to be subjected to such a
5 chokehold in the future; future injury entirely speculative.) Petitioner relies on
6 *Demery v. Arpaio*, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) in support of the "capable-of-
7 repetition-yet-evading-review" exception to mootness. See [*Spencer v. Kemna*](#),
8 [523 U.S. 1, 17-18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 \(1998\)](#). As the *Demery* court
9 noted, "[t]his branch applies when (1) the duration of the challenged action is too
10 short to be litigated prior to cessation, and (2) there is a "reasonable expectation"
11 that the same parties will be subjected to the same offending conduct." 378 F.3d,
12 at 1027, citing [*Spencer v. Kemna*](#), 523 U.S. 1, 17-18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d
13 43 (1998); [*Mitchell v. Dupnik*](#), 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir.1996). Both prongs
14 must be met. As in the current case with Mr. Hooks, in the instance of a pretrial
15 detention center, "the length of detention in the county jail is short enough that
16 any individual detainee's claim would probably become moot before trial."
17 [*Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink*](#), 322 F.3d 1101, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2003). As the
18 Supreme Court has explained, "[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary, and it
19 is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
20 decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted." [*Gerstein v. Pugh*](#),
21 [420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 \(1975\)](#). In this instance, the
22 first prong is clearly met, as Mr. Hooks has been detained temporarily in Yakima
23 and King County jails.

1 As to the second prong, a divided *Demery* court expressly found a factual basis
2 for the substantial likelihood that plaintiffs would be reincarcerated in the
3 offending facility:

4 the record here contains compelling evidence that
5 the plaintiffs likely will be reincarcerated at the
6 Madison Street Jail. For example, plaintiff Benny
7 Berryman was detained at the Madison Street Jail
8 on twenty different occasions between February
9 1997 and June 2002. Eleven other named
10 plaintiffs also have been detained at the Madison
11 Street Jail on more than one occasion. Thus, this
12 controversy also satisfies the capable-of-repetition
13 prong.

14 *Id.* at 1027.

15 14. The Hooks record is devoid of any such evidence there is a "reasonable
16 expectation" that petitioner will be subjected to the same objectionable conduct
17 of a future transfer to Yakima. While it is theoretically possible that a delay in or
18 continuance of the municipal trial could result in a transfer to Yakima and the
19 possibility of some future due process violation, this Court can not reach such a
20 result on this record to support the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition
21 for this petitioner. The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception will
22 not be applied where there is no more than a theoretical possibility that the same
23 party will be subject to the same action again. See *Murphy v Hunt*, 455 U.S. 478,
71 L.Ed.2d 353, 102 S.Ct. 1181 (1982) ; Cf. *Lynch v United States*, 557 A2d
580 (D.C. 1989) (challenge to state's bail restriction was moot where appellant
had already been convicted of three offenses and it was unlikely that all three
convictions would be overturned so as to place appellant in a situation where he

1 might seek bail again) or where the plaintiff can show only that other people may
2 litigate a similar claim in the future. *See Funbus Systems, Inc. v California Public*
3 *Utilities Com.*, 801 F.2d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 1986).

4 15. Petitioner Hooks has moved to amend the writ application to join The Defender
5 Association (“TDA”) and the Associated Counsel for the Accused (“ACA”) as
6 parties. Petitioner contends the two associations representing indigent defendants
7 have representative standing. Petitioner maintains that the City of Seattle will not
8 be prejudiced because petitioner contends that the evidence in support of his writ
9 was typical of those for other detainees. However, it is clear to this Court that the
10 City will be prejudiced by such an amendment to the petition as much of the city’s
11 defense was focused on this petitioner, his experience, and absence of likely future
12 harm to this petitioner. Petitioner’s motion to amend comes after the close of
13 evidence and closing arguments of counsel. Accordingly, in this pleading and by
14 separate order, the motion to amend to add ACA and TDA as additional petitioners
15 is DENIED on the basis of untimeliness.

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1 For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Hooks' petition for writ of prohibition to
2 prevent his transfer by the City of Seattle to the Yakima Jail while he awaits trial
3 in Seattle Municipal Court is DENIED.

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6 Dated this 1st day of _June_,_ 2005.

7 _____/s/
8 John P. Erlick, Judge
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